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Abstract
In law, normativism and pragmatism have always been 
under tension and this has been revealed in many dif-
ferent ways. One of its manifestations can be found in 
adjudication, where the technical/juridical role of the 
judge has, in many countries, assumed political con-
tours, a phenomenon described as “judicialization of 
politics”. This paper will examine the vanishing boundar-
ies between the technical and the political, using Brazil 
as an example, and will analyze the hypothesis that the 
“O único sentido íntimo das cousas 
É elas não terem sentido íntimo nenhum”
Alberto Caeiro1
1  “The only intimal sense of things / Is that they have no intimal sense at all.” CAEIRO, Alberto (Fernando Pessoa). 
Poema V. In: Poesia. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2001, p. 32.
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Resumo
No Direito, normativismo e pragmatismo sempre estiveram 
sob tensão e isso tem se revelado das mais diversas formas. 
Uma das manifestações dessa tensão pode ser encontrada 
no julgamento de casos concretos, em que se percebe (em 
muitos países) que o papel técnico/jurídico do juiz assumiu 
contornos políticos, um fenômeno descrito como “judicia-
lização da política”. Este trabalho irá examinar os esvaeci-
dos limites entre o técnico e o político a partir do exemplo 
brasileiro, e analisará a hipótese de que a existência de 
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1. NORMATIVISM AND PRAGMATISM IN ADJUDICATION: THE 
TECHNICAL AND THE POLITICAL 
The tension between normativism and pragmatism in law appears under many 
different facets. It has been contemplated as the core of juridical science: the Is/Ought 
dichotomy and the logical gap between indicative and directive discourses gave law 
scholars a proper object of study.
In order to comply with a positivist concept of science, scholars at first decided 
that the science of law would analyze the law in a descriptive manner, never producing 
judgments of value regarding their object of study.1 This solved the issue, for the law, 
expressed in directive discourses (the Ought), was in conflict with the current definition 
of scientific knowledge: systematized objective knowledge, expressed by indicative 
discourses alone (the Is). Only indicative propositions can be true or false – for prescrip-
tive discourse, the distinction makes no sense.2 So, the science of law was metalinguis-
tic discourse about law, an objective description of law and its valid rules.3 This was the 
solution pointed by Kelsen, since he could not accept norms being treated as facts.4 
The solution was only apparent. This concept of the science of law was criticized 
in many ways. The departure point is false, since propositions about law are equivalent 
to the prescription contained in a rule: saying “the rule that obligates people to pay 
1  Criticizing this concept: HACHEM, Daniel Wunder. O Estado moderno, a construção cientificista do Direito e 
o princípio da legalidade no constitucionalismo liberal oitocentista. A&C – Revista de Direito Administrativo 
& Constitucional, Belo Horizonte, ano 11, n. 46, p. 199-219, out./dez. 2011.
2  PINTORE, Anna, Law without truth, Liverpool, U.K.: Deborah Charles Publications, 2000, p. 3 and 13.
3  TROPER, Michel, A filosofia do direito, São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2008, p. 35–41.
4  Kelsen departed from Hume’s law: no prescriptions can derive from descriptions, and vice-versa. KELSEN, 
Hans, Teoria pura do direito, São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2006, p. 79–86.
existence of clear borderlines, in these terms, is thing of 
the past. The formalist assumption that judges only sub-
sume facts into abstract rules has been ruled out by most 
scholars, but the institutional design and the concept 
of separation of powers that come with it have not. The 
investigation of the courts’ current practices and the con-
sideration of legal theory show that these limits should 
be redesigned. 
Keywords: separation of powers; institutional design; 
legal theory; politics; judicialization of politics
fronteiras claras, nos termos mencionados, é coisa do pas-
sado. A suposição formalista de que juízes apenas subsu-
mem fatos a regras abstratas foi descartada pela maioria 
dos doutrinadores, mas o desenho institucional e o conceito 
de separação de poderes que a acompanham não o foram. 
A análise das práticas atuais dos tribunais e a consideração 
de aspectos de teoria do direito mostrarão que esses limites 
devem ser redesenhados.
Palavras-chave: separação de poderes; desenho institu-
cional; teoria do Direito; política; judicialização da política.
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taxes is valid” is the same as saying “you are obliged to pay taxes”.5 These propositions 
express valid rules do exist, and all rules express judgments of value.6
The problem of the science of law is only one of the facades that express how 
the world of norms and the world of facts may be irreconcilable or, at least, only par-
tially reconcilable. 
Another one of these facades is present in adjudication, for courts may be torn 
between the pragmatic concerns of a concrete case and the possible normative impli-
cations of the decision for society. This specific version of the tension is most evident 
in common law systems, where the existence of binding precedents brings (potential) 
normative repercussions to every single case. 
Traditionally, in civil law systems, this aspect of the courts’ activity has been 
denied by the legalist conception of how legal rules are applied to concrete cases: 
through logical and formal reasoning alone, subsuming the cases into abstract rules. In 
this conception, adjudication only affects the single case under scrutiny.
In Brazil, the courts have been called upon to implement the 1988 Constitu-
tion and have succeed in some cases, but they have also given rise to concerns about 
the political activity of the Judiciary. To reinforce the boundaries between the technical 
(the juridical, the application of rules by courts) and the political (to be defined by the 
elected representatives of the people), scholars tried to constraint judges, restricting 
their ability to define public policy. The Supreme Court has also tried to reestablish such 
limits and thus control this abnormal judicial activity. 
The limits proposed, nevertheless, have not worked as planned. The Supreme 
Court itself, surprisingly, defines polemic policy issues while stating it is not doing so. 
Other attempts to constrain judicial activity in such matters have failed for different 
reasons and the global phenomenon of the “judicialization of politics” seems to be 
unstoppable. 
Using Brazil as an example, this paper will examine the vanishing boundaries 
between the technical and the political and analyze the hypothesis that the existence 
of clear borderlines, in these terms, is a thing of the past. The formalist assumption that 
judges only subsume facts into abstract rules has been ruled out by most scholars, but 
the institutional design and the concept of separation of powers that come with it have 
not. An investigation of the courts’ current practices and a consideration of legal theory 
suggest that these limits should be redesigned. 
In order to pursue this analysis, I will begin with the cases commonly used as ex-
amples of judicialization of politics in the Brazilian context, then describe how scholars 
have evaluated these breaches of the separation between law and politics. For most 
5  ROSS, Alf, Direito e justiça, Bauru: EDIPRO, 2007, p. 24.
6  TROPER, A filosofia do direito, p. 49.
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authors, this diagnosis demands a reaction, since these breaches need to be controlled, 
and they have attempted to create limits to this polemic activity of the courts. They 
have not succeeded, however. I will then consider hypothetical explanations for the 
failure of such measures. Finally, (although far from reaching a conclusion) I will pro-
pose that a fixed separation of the technical and the political, even if it were possible, is 
incompatible with most contemporary understandings of law (for example, post-pos-
itivist conceptions of legal theory). Thus, the institutional design and the roles of the 
different branches of government need to be reevaluated to accommodate current 
notions of law, adjudication and interpretation.     
2. BREAKING THE LIMITS: THE BRAZILIAN CASE
In 1964, a coup d’état conducted by the military overthrew the government of 
democratically-elected President João Goulart. The military dictatorship that followed 
lasted 21 years: in 1985, a civilian president elected by representatives took office, but 
democracy was only reinstated in 1988, with the promulgation of the current Constitu-
tion. The first democratic elections took place in 1989 after almost 30 years of military 
rule. 
The 1988 Constitution is considered highly progressive and established goals 
and objectives for the nation, such as national development and the termination of pov-
erty. Many social and political rights are guaranteed in its text, which at first generated 
a conflict between scholars concerning the efficacy of the constitutional norms. Some 
scholars argued that many social rights were to be considered “programmatic norms” to 
be slowly implemented by the Legislative and Executive branches; while another group 
affirmed they were fully efficacious and should be applied by the Judiciary in concrete 
cases.7 The “effectiveness doctrine”, as it became known, was victorious and the courts 
followed suit, considering the Constitution completely and immediately effective.8 All 
“fundamental rights” could be implemented and protected through adjudication.
Under this interpretation, all public policies were potentially subject to judicial 
control, since they were deemed to be in accordance with the Constitution and aimed 
towards its realization. Litigation provided important advances in different fields, but 
one of the most famous cases of success involved HIV policy. NGOs provided innova-
tive legal assistance, going beyond reactions to the violation of rights and formulating 
alternative proposals for public policies. 
The judicial claims started in 1990 and tried to pressure the Executive into of-
fering universal assistance to people with HIV based on the fundamental right to free 
7  This discussion was influenced by Portuguese scholarship – the Portuguese Constitution established differ-
ent regimes for liberties and for social, economic and cultural rights. 
8  KELSEN, Hans, Teoria pura do direito, São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2006, p. 79–86.
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public healthcare. In 1991, the medication AZT, an antiretroviral drug, started being dis-
tributed by SUS (Unified Healthcare System); and in 1995 the different drugs compos-
ing the so-called “HIV cocktail” were circulated free of charge.9  These changes in policy 
were promoted by individual claims that established judicial precedents and also put 
pressure on the Legislative branch, which passed Act 9313 in 1996, making SUS respon-
sible for providing all the medication necessary for the treatment of HIV.10
Other claims related to the right to public healthcare reached the Judiciary, 
some as successful as the HIV case. Nonetheless, many cases produced only individual 
results, providing treatment for the plaintiff alone and failing to alter policies for all 
citizens. Even though these cases are commonly considered as examples of the courts’ 
adjustment of public policies, they do not even address them. The plaintiffs only ask 
for individual treatment, which is not a matter of policy – even if may affect it through 
budgetary consequences. Nevertheless, the HIV cases demonstrate some possibility of 
altering political decisions through the Judiciary, forcing the limits between the tech-
nical and the political.  
Boundaries between law and politics were also challenged in the 1990 Consum-
er Protection Act, particularly because the statute strengthened the collective civil pro-
cedure system. Different statutes have built this system throughout the years, but the 
Consumer Act defined collective rights (which cannot be individually claimed, since 
they are considered indivisible by nature) and introduced the possibility of collective 
protection to violated individual rights, somewhat similar to US class actions. 
Litigating for the protection of collective rights or to protect individual rights 
that belong to a considerably large group of people has been compared to regulation. 
Adjudication, in these cases, affects many citizens and will regulate the rights involved 
in the given situation. 11 In the Brazilian case, the entire population may suffer the im-
pact of a single decision. Obviously, this regulation differs from the one that emanates 
from the Executive or Legislative branches, in particular because it was developed to 
work within the institution of civil adjudication.12
Regulation through collective procedure certainly blurs the lines separating 
the juridical and the political. In civil law countries, and particularly in Brazil, this is 
9  VENTURA, Miriam, Strategies to promote and guarantee the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS, Divul-
gação em Saúde para Debate, v. 27, p. 239–246, 2003, p. 244–245.
10  These drugs were the object of compulsory patents licensing, which generated a WTO complaint by the 
US against Brazil in 2001, arguing that the policy (more specifically, an article of the Brazilian Patent Law on 
the possibilities of compulsory licenses) was violating the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). The complaint was withdrawn and the discussion ended with the unanimous approval 
(at the WTO) of a declaration establishing that the TRIPS agreement should not relegate public health issues 
to a secondary position. 
11  BONE, Robert G., The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and 
Class Actions, George Washington Law Review, v. 79, n. 2, p. 577, 2011, p. 595.
12  Ibid., p. 596.
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noteworthy, for historically a judicial decision will only affect the parties involved in liti-
gation, even though the same decision could be applied to analogous cases. In a collec-
tive procedure dispute, this “rule” is broken, either because all are holders of the same 
collective right, or because all individual cases will receive exactly the same treatment. 
The above-mentioned Consumer Act also establishes a mechanism of private 
enforcement, mobilizing private litigants to assure the implementation of the statute.13 
No public agency is specifically designed to safeguard consumers’ rights; the only agen-
cy dealing with such issues works exclusively as a mediator in consumer disputes. The 
statute was enacted through lawsuits from the start, and it contains other procedural 
rules that corroborate to this hypothesis. These rules clearly protect consumers and fa-
cilitate the filing of the suit. The burden of proof lies with the defendant, unless the 
claims are implausible, and as a general rule (not only in the case of consumers’ rights) 
the winning plaintiffs will recover all expenses from the defendants. Both aspects create 
the most favorable scenario for consumers and stimulate private enforcement through 
adjudication. 
Private enforcement is common in other countries, such as the US,14 and stat-
utes and administrative regulations are enacted through these means. In the American 
context, consumer rights and job discrimination statutes have been privately enforced 
for some time.15 This sort of implementation also challenges the limits between the po-
litical and the technical, since the social goal that determines the creation of a statute, 
piece of regulation or public policy depends entirely on adjudication. The politically 
established objectives will only be reached through the actions of private subjects in 
the Judiciary. 
Private enforcement may be the most effective way of enacting regulation, es-
pecially for those situations in which monitoring compliance is particularly difficult or 
expensive. Consumer law fits this description exactly, since consumers themselves are 
in the best position to verify observance. Of course, the efficiency of this sort of enforce-
ment depends directly on the incentives to adjudicate, for if they are not advantageous 
enough consumers may be discouraged from filing suit – and the enforcement will fail 
or not occur at all. 
Finally, the defining limits have been breached by the growing similarities be-
tween civil law and common law countries.16 Many countries with civil law traditions 
13  On private enforcement: FARHANG, Sean, Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the American Separation 
of Powers System, American Journal of Political Science, v. 52, n. 4, p. 821–839, 2008, p. 822.
14  In fact, all scholarship on private enforcement cited on this paper comes from the US. The theme is yet to be 
profoundly discussed in Brazil. 
15  BURBANK, Stephen B.; FARHANG, Sean; KRITZER, Herbert M., Private Enforcement of Statutory and Adminis-
trative Law in the United States (and Other Common Law Countries), 2011.
16  The theme has been frequently discussed in Brazil and Italy. MARINONI, Luiz Guilherme, Aproximação crí-
tica entre as jurisdições de civil law e de common law e a necessidade de respeito aos precedentes no Brasil, 
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have been adopting some version of stare decisis. The Brazilian Judiciary is currently 
overloaded with cases and the problem is particularly serious in the higher courts. Any 
case can potentially brought before the Supreme Court through the appeal system (at 
least theoretically). The court decides more than 70,000 cases every year. In fact, the 
number has been reduced after several reforms of the civil procedure code, which pre-
viously surpassed 100,000 decisions per year. 
Most of these reforms attempted to bind the inferior courts to the judgments of 
the Supreme Court (and also those of the Superior Court of Justice). Others have tried 
to bind the courts to their own precedents, with the objective of avoiding irrational and 
useless appeals. The Supreme Court’s precedents, that previously affected the entire 
population only in exceptional cases (when judicial review was performed in abstract, 
as is done in the European tradition), may determine the outcome of many cases at 
once. This has been a remarkable innovation and an impressive break with tradition. 
Today, the Supreme Court has mechanisms to establish guidelines (called súmulas vin-
culantes) that bind not only the Judiciary, but also the Executive and all its agencies, and 
all cases trialed can (or at least should) influence lower courts’ decisions.17 
Once again, this can be understood as an infringement of the boundaries be-
tween the political and the juridical. The Judiciary has never had these competences, 
as they are not part of the civil law tradition, and the normative repercussions of judg-
ments have never been this visible before. Some of these infringements have been 
neglected by Brazilian scholars, and their political implications have been ignored, 
while others, particularly of the first kind/ (the implementation of fundamental rights 
through adjudication), have been ferociously criticized, as they were classified as effects 
of the judicialization of politics.
3. THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS: DEFENDING THE BOUND-
ARIES
The judicialization of politics or the politicization of the Judiciary is seen as a 
worldwide phenomenon. It refers to the expansion of the Judiciary’s role in the deci-
sion-making processes that govern contemporary democracies. Comparative research 
Revista da Faculdade de Direito UFPR, v. 49, p. 11–58, 2010; TARUFFO, Michele, Observações sobre os mo-
delos processuais de civil law e de common law, Revista de Processo, v. 110, n. 28, p. 141–158, abr./jun. 2003. 
17  On the Brazilian binding mechanisms: BARBOZA, Estefânia Maria de Queiroz. Escrevendo um romance por 
meio dos precedentes judiciais: uma possibilidade de segurança jurídica para a jurisdição constitucional bra-
sileira. A&C – Revista de Direito Administrativo & Constitucional, Belo Horizonte, ano 14, n. 56, p. 177-207, 
abr./jun. 2014.
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shows that this enlargement takes place in many countries and assumes different char-
acteristics according to the local social structures and political arrangements.18
The term “judicialization” can also refer to the dislocation of these decision-mak-
ing processes from the political branches (Executive and Legislative) to the Judiciary, 
the technical branch par excellence. However, it can also be used to describe the use 
of judicial decision-making methods by the other branches. In the first case, there is 
judicialization from without; in the second case, from within.19 Note that the criterion 
for determining what is within and what is without are the political branches, indicating 
that political issues belong in the Executive or in the Legislative.
The phenomenon is generally considered as something to be combatted or at 
least, controlled.20 The counter-majoritarian character of the Judiciary is considered to 
be in tension with democracy and the legitimacy of judicial review of statutes, policy, 
regulation – anything that represents a political decision made by the elected branches 
– is questioned.21 
Since the phenomenon is present in many different countries, ascertaining a 
single cause for the politicization of courts is challenging. Constitutionalism has been 
mostly to blame: in the 20th century, many nations have adopted Constitutions defin-
ing government and State power; one of the biggest concerns in the process has been 
the control of power. Different versions of a checks and balances system, balancing 
the three classical branches, have been implemented. Since political matters had been 
included in the Constitution, it was only a matter of time before the judicial branch 
started addressing political issues as constitutional ones.22 
In addition, many of these Constitutions determine fundamental/human rights, 
which are protected against the parliamentary majority. Even some countries in the 
common law tradition, such as New Zealand, have embraced some form of Bill of 
Rights. The Judiciary, in some cases,23 is in charge of this protection and enforces it 
through judicial review. These rights also need to be materialized and guaranteed, and 
18  TATE, Chester Neal; VALLINDER, Torbjorn, The global expansion of judicial power, New York: New York 
University Press, 1995.
19  Ibid., p. 16; BARBOZA, Estefania Queiroz; KOZICKI, Katya, Judicialization of Politics and the Judicial Review 
of Public Policies by the Brazilian Supreme Court, Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2014, 
p. 408–409.
20  For the legitimation of judicial review, as long as it is controlled, check: ELY, John Hart, Democracy and 
Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
21  BICKEL, Alexander M., The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, [s.l.]: Yale 
University Press, 1986.
22  BARBOZA; KOZICKI, Judicialization of Politics and the Judicial Review of Public Policies by the Brazilian 
Supreme Court, p. 409–410.
23  Some of the countries that traditionally did not allow the Judiciary to perform this control have implement-
ed some form of judicial review. This has happened in the French case. 
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this demands a creative approach to adjudication: a judge-made law approach, more 
typical of common law systems.24
To sum up, according to this account, the inclusion of political matters, espe-
cially those concerning the checks and balances system, along with the inclusion of 
fundamental rights in contemporary Constitutions have been mainly responsible for 
the judicialization of politics.
Some scholars, without discarding the previous explanation, emphasize the 
subjective dimension of the issue, affirming that the phenomenon requires judges who 
are willing to participate in policy-making and would rather alter policies than simply 
leave the task to the other branches.25 Other explanations are the crisis of the represen-
tative system of contemporary democracies and a general distrust in the legislature. 
This expansion of the Judiciary’s activity, however, is commonly described in an 
ahistorical manner. There is little description of how the Judiciary acted before these 
comprehensive Constitutions arose – before judicialization.26 It is not clear whether it 
did not interfere with politics or rather just did so in some way other than the effectu-
ation of constitutional rights. In fact, the political and the technical are so close that 
perhaps this strict separation exists only as an ideal.27 
In the Brazilian case, every description of the judicialization of politics starts in 
1988 and with the post-‘88 factors that have contributed to the phenomenon. Even 
papers that exclusively examine the Supreme Court and depart from some empirical re-
search do not describe the prior conditions.28  Democracy is widely considered practi-
cally a prerequisite for judicialization, and Brazil endured 21 years of dictatorship. There 
are, nevertheless, cases decided during the military regime in which the Supreme Court 
altered policies and even engaged in political conflict with the legislature.29
The innovative approaches usually try to elaborate new solutions to the issue,30 
but there is a lack of investigations directed towards the past. Different diagnoses are 
24  BARBOZA; KOZICKI, Judicialization of Politics and the Judicial Review of Public Policies by the Brazilian 
Supreme Court, p. 413.
25  MACIEL, Débora Alves; KOERNER, Andrei, Sentidos da judicialização da política: duas análises, Lua nova, 
v. 57, p. 113–133, 2002, p. 114.
26  There is an article that deals with judicial activism with historic concerns, in a specific period of time. Tush-
net describes the liberal judicial restraint of the US Supreme Court in the early decades of the 20th century, 
comparing it to the judicial engagement of the 50s and 60s. TUSHNET, Mark, From Judicial Restraint to Judicial 
Engagement: A Short Intellectual History, Geo. Mason L. Rev., v. 19, p. 1043, 2011.
27  Or maybe as a regulatory idea.
28  CASTRO, Marcos Faro de. O Supremo Tribunal Federal e a judicialização da política, 1997. Disponível em: 
<http://www.anpocs.org.br/portal/publicacoes/rbcs_00_34/rbcs34_09>. Acesso em: 10 out. 2014.
29  FONSECA, Juliana Ponde. (Des)Controle do Estado no Judiciário Brasileiro: direito e política em pro-
cesso. 2015. 316 f. Tese (Doutorado em Direito) – Faculdade de Direito, Universidade Federal do Paraná, 2015, 
p. 85 e ss. 
30  CARVALHO, Ernani Rodrigues de. Em busca da judicialização da política no Brasil: apontamentos para uma 
nova abordagem, Revista de sociologia e política, v. 23, n. 23, p. 115–126, 2004.
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also very rare. All cited papers view judicialization as a consequence of the inclusion of 
political matters and fundamental rights in the contemporary Constitutions, since this 
would have led to a brand new role for the Judiciary. 
4. REESTABLISHING THE LIMITS
The intense discussions concerning the judicialization of politics and the judicial 
review of public policies have provoked reactions from the courts and from scholars. 
Worried about the political activity of the Judiciary, its lack of accountability and tech-
nical knowledge, its deficiency in/weak/lack of democratic legitimacy and with the un-
equal treatment that was being promoted by such lawsuits, they designed new limits 
for policy concerning adjudication. 
The courts themselves were, and still are, fierce advocates for the limitation of 
the political activity of the Judiciary. The Supreme Court designed two of these new 
limits, one generic and one specific. Generically, the Supreme Court has stated it can 
only act as a negative legislator, never as a positive one, with respect to innovation in 
the system.31 It can only invalidate those statutes and policies that are shown to be in 
conflict with the 1988 Constitution through judicial review. This guideline is to be fol-
lowed by all courts, since every judge in Brazil is supposed to perform judicial review in 
concrete cases.32 Policies are supposed to be elaborated by the other branches, and the 
Judiciary will only invalidate the ones deemed unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court has also designed a specific limit concerning cases involving 
the right to free public healthcare. In this case, the court established criteria to order 
or to deny the treatment or medication being requested by the petitioner.33 The first 
standard concerns whether the treatment is part of a public policy. Sometimes, the 
policy exists but it is not implemented in all areas in the country. If the treatment is 
provided by policy and not delivered to the population, the Judiciary should ensure its 
effectuation.  
If the treatment is not foreseen in a public health policy, it is important to exam-
ine the reasons for such exclusion – whether it is caused by: a) an omission (from the 
Legislative or the Executive); b) a policy decision not to provide such treatment; or c) a 
legal prohibition. Legal prohibitions take place when the treatment has been consid-
ered unsafe by the governmental agency that regulates drug administration or when 
31  Judgments by the STF, the Brazilian Supreme Court: RE 412.670/SC and RE 431.001/AC. This guideline was 
affirmed by justices (or ministers, as they are known) with opposing views in many matters.
32  The Brazilian system is a hybrid that mixes the US judicial review with the European tradition. It can analyze 
statutes and policies in abstract or within the framework of concrete cases, but the first can only be executed 
by the Supreme Court.
33  The criteria were established in SL 47 and STA 175 (STF judgments). 
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it has not yet been tested by the agency. If the treatment is forbidden, the Judiciary 
should promptly deny the claim.
Problems arise in the two other cases. If there is an omission or a negative deci-
sion, the judge should investigate whether there is an analogous treatment provided 
by policy. If there is, the plaintiff should use the offered treatment, unless it is proven to 
be ineffective or inadequate in that concrete case. The criteria therefore determine that 
the Judiciary will only order the government to provide a treatment that is different 
from the one determined by policy if that treatment is inefficient. 
In cases where no treatment is defined in policy, the judge should at first inquire 
whether the care sought by the plaintiff is experimental and thus not approved by the 
governmental agency. If it is, she should deny the claim. Only if it is already approved is 
the judge allowed to further scrutinize the merits of the case. The criteria are reasonably 
clear and should provide rational guidelines for the Judiciary, but they are not as effec-
tive as the Supreme Court thought they would be. 
Scholars have also tried to define limits on the political activity of the Judiciary 
and created categories to define what citizens could demand from the government 
(changing policy) through adjudication. The categories were developed after many 
claims demanding medical treatments were initiated, based on the right to free public 
healthcare. Thus, these sorts of claims inspired both the limitations developed by the 
courts themselves and the ones elaborated through scholarship.
The first one, “reserva do possível” (reasonableness exemption), affirms that the 
government is not obliged to provide what is beyond reasonable expectations. When 
determining what is reasonable, one must consider the resources available to effec-
tuate fundamental rights, the government’s budgetary constraints and the adequacy 
and reasonableness of what the citizen requires.34 The category was inspired by a 1972 
judgment of the German Constitutional Court. 
“Mínimo existencial” (existential minimum) is the second category, and asserts 
that the constitutional social rights can be claimed through the Judiciary only to the 
extent they are indispensable to a decent existence. Anything beyond that is subject 
to political decisions involving the definition of public policy.35 Some scholars affirm 
that the minimum can only be defined in a concrete case and never a priori,36 while 
others claim that it includes basic education (high school level), basic healthcare, social 
assistance (food, clothes and shelter) and access to the Judiciary (in Brazil, universal 
34  SARLET, Ingo Wolfgang, A eficácia dos direitos fundamentais: uma teoria geral dos direitos fundamen-
tais na perspectiva constitucional, 10. ed. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2010, p. 287.
35  TORRES, Ricardo Lobo, O direito ao mínimo existencial, Rio de Janeiro: Renovar, 2009, p. 41–43.
36  Ibid., p. 13.
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access to the courts is considered a fundamental right, and involves total exemption of 
expenses and free legal counseling).37 
The first category is negative, creating an exemption or a limitation of govern-
mental responsibility in effectuating constitutional rights, while the second is positive, 
defining what can actually be pursued by citizens through adjudication. This difference 
is expressed by the fact that scholars differ on the simultaneous use of the two catego-
ries. Some insist the existential minimum is warranted and should never be subject to 
the reasonableness exemption – only what is beyond the minimum can be considered 
beyond reasonable expectations.38 Others take contrary view (the minimum is subject 
to the “reserva do possível”),39 which renders the existential minimum useless, for only 
the reasonable can be demanded through adjudication, even if what is considered fea-
sible is well below the basic needs for a decent existence. 
The scholars’ attempts to limit the Judiciary have not been confined to these cat-
egories. Since adjudication in civil law countries usually affects only the litigating par-
ties, the perverse effects of an individual change in policy were also addressed. Take the 
claims involving the right to free public healthcare once again: one plaintiff can obtain 
very expensive medical treatment, while others under the same conditions, suffering 
from the same disease, will not receive it because they have not filed suit. Considering 
that the aforementioned right to access the Judiciary has not yet been implemented in 
Brazil, it is likely that the poorest part of the population will never go to court and will 
therefore be given unequal treatment. The problem can also be analyzed through the 
lens of governmental budgetary constraints. The necessary funding for such treatment 
will come out of the general healthcare budget, impairing the services provided for all 
citizens. Nevertheless, all these concerns can be described as mainly political. This also 
applies to the categories of reasonableness exemption and existential minimum, which 
impose a specific kind of political reasoning to the decision making process. 
These concerns shift the micro justice focus, typical of adjudication in civil law 
countries – which only affects the parties and is concerned exclusively with their issues 
– to the macro justice point of view. Micro-level justice focuses on the needs of the in-
dividual victim or plaintiff, and on the relationships between individuals. On the other 
37  BARCELLOS, Ana Paula de, A eficácia jurídica dos princípios constitucionais: o princípio da dignidade 
da pessoa humana, 3. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Renovar, 2011, p. 300–302.
38  TORRES, Ricardo Lobo, O mínimo existencial, os direitos sociais e os desafios de natureza orçamentária, 
in: SARLET, Ingo Wolfgang; TIMM, Luciano Benetti (Orgs.), Direitos fundamentais: orçamento e “reserva do 
possível”, 2. ed. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2010, p. 74.
39  SARLET, Ingo Wolfgang; FIGUEIREDO, Mariana Fichtiner, Reserva do possível, mínimo existencial e direito à 
saúde: algumas aproximações, in: SARLET, Ingo Wolfgang; TIMM, Luciano Benetti (Orgs.), Direitos fundamen-
tais: orçamento e “reserva do possível”, 2. ed. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2010, p. 27.
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hand, macro-level justice focuses the needs of society as a whole and is concerned with 
the development of the social order.40
Micro and macro justice cannot be automatically linked to any of the existing 
typological distinctions in the justice literature.41 They denote different points of view 
that may be applied to distributive justice (which focus on the fairness of outcome dis-
tributions), procedural justice (fairness of the procedures determining these outcomes), 
interactional justice (which refers to the treatment people receive), restorative justice 
(focused on the dignity of victims) and retributive justice (referring to the punishment 
of perpetrators). Considering distributive justice, for example, a macro perspective 
would focus on equality, while a micro-justice analysis would focus on equity and re-
gard outcomes as fair if they are proportional to inputs and contributions. 
Scholars have claimed, therefore, that any interference with public policy 
through adjudication has to must be advanced through collective procedure,42 in the-
ory more permeable to the macro justice perspective. The legitimacy of the Judiciary 
to intervene in political issues would be strengthened by the collective protection of 
rights and the problems of macro-level justice would be solved. 
These efforts to limit the political activity of the Judiciary have, nonetheless, 
failed. The immediate reasons for this failure are examined next. 
5. VANISHING BOUNDARIES
None of the attempts to restrain the Judiciary in public policy issues have 
reached their desired goals. It is impossible to determine the exact causes of this fail-
ure, but one can certainly speculate, given some facts that involve the implementation 
of the mentioned limits. 
The Supreme Court has established the generic limit of the negative legislator, 
but it has failed to act as one in many important judgments in the past few years. In the 
2011 judgment of ADI 4277 and ADPF 132 (decided together), the court vetoed any 
interpretation of the concept of family in Brazilian law that excluded same-sex couples. 
The decision made the civil union of homosexual and trans couples legal. Some months 
later, the National Council of Justice (CNJ) determined that the justices of the peace 
40  LILLIE, Christine; JANOFF-BULMAN, Ronnie, Macro versus micro justice and perceived fairness of truth and 
reconciliation commissions., Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, v. 13, n. 2, p. 221–236, 2007, 
p. 222.
41  Some authors disagree and always link macro justice with equality and micro justice with equity. SINCLAIR, 
Robert C.; MARK, Melvin M., Mood and the Endorsement of Egalitarian Macrojustice Versus Equity-Based Micro-
justice Principles, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, v. 17, n. 4, p. 369–375, 1991, p. 369.
42  BARCELLOS, Ana Paula de, Constitucionalização das políticas públicas em matéria de direitos fundamentais: 
o controle político-social e o controle jurídico no espaço democrático, in: SARLET, Ingo Wolfgang; TIMM, Lucia-
no Benetti (Orgs.), Direitos fundamentais: orçamento e “reserva do possível”, 2. ed. Porto Alegre: Livraria 
do Advogado, 2010, p. 116–124.
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were to perform same-sex marriages all over the country, going beyond the Supreme 
Court decision (civil union and marriage have similar legal consequences, but are still 
different categories in under Brazilian law). 
In the 2012 judgment of ADPF 54, the Supreme Court allowed the abortion of 
anencephalic fetuses, creating a new carve-out for the crime of abortion,43 permitted 
only when the pregnancy will harm the mother’s health and or when it was in conse-
quence of rape. 44  The topic is extremely controversial in a predominantly catholic and 
protestant country. 
Other cases, involving freedom of the press and free speech, and elections, 
demonstrate that the court does act as a positive legislator, introducing innovations 
into the system and surpassing the limits it has created for itself (and the rest of the 
Judiciary). 
The specific limits created to guide the judges in cases involving the right to free 
public healthcare have been just as unsuccessful. The federal government’s expendi-
ture with medical treatments ordered by the courts has grown from 2.5 million Brazil-
ian reais in 2005 to 266 million reais in 2011.45 Thus, judges do not seem to follow the 
guidelines suggested by the higher courts, and tend to order the government to cover 
treatments and medications that are not predicted in the SUS policies. When the life of 
the plaintiff is at stake, the judges focus exclusively on micro-justice matters. In these 
cases, the categories designed by scholarship fail as well. The right to public healthcare 
is considered to be within the existential minimum and only experimental treatments 
or drugs have been denied. 
Even if these categories had been successful, they would still have their own 
problems. The reasonableness exemption demands proof of the lack of resources to 
effectuate the violated fundamental right. If the resources are unavailable because they 
are destined for other ends, as determined in the governmental budget (which is a 
piece of legislation designed by the Executive and approved by the Legislative every 
year), the effective application of these resources has to be demonstrated. 
The government’s annual budget follows a series of prerequisites established by 
law and all formalities are always respected, but there is no obligation to actually spend 
the resources. The unspent funds are redirected to the payment of federal public debt. 
43  Abortion is considered a crime in Brazil. 
44  These were the practical effects of the decision. The Court actually used the euphemism “interruption of 
pregnancy” to describe the procedure, stating that it was not an abortion per se, because the fetus would never 
be an alive human person. 
45  TRIBUNAL DE CONTAS DA UNIÃO, Relatório sistêmico de fiscalização da saúde, Brasília: Tribunal de Con-
tas da União, 2013, p. 139.
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Studies show that in some cases less than 1% of the funding is actually directed to the 
goals established in the budget.46
Demonstrating an efficient allocation of public resources, or even the simple 
fulfillment of the annual budget, is difficult in Brazil. If taken seriously, it is practically 
impossible to prove that the reasonableness exemption is applicable because of the 
lack of such resources.
The existential minimum, on the other hand, establishes that only the bare min-
imum conditions to a decent existence can be object of adjudication. If the minimum 
is to be defined in a concrete case, the limitation to the political activity of the Judiciary 
may be non-existent, since the magistrate is always able to set the minimum to what-
ever the plaintiff demands. On the other hand, if the magistrate adopts an austere defi-
nition of the minimum, this may obstruct all possibilities of effectuating constitutional 
rights through adjudication. The category, in fact, is unable to limit the Judiciary, for 
it creates no standard at all. Besides, if both categories are used in the same case, the 
existential minimum loses all usefulness and only the reasonable exemption is to be 
applied, as mentioned above. 
Finally, the scholarly suggestion that policy change is to be made by the Ju-
diciary only through collective procedure has also failed. The collective procedure is 
still under development, in the sense that the courts have yet to develop trustworthy 
precedents on the matter. Many cases have been trialed at the lower courts only to be 
extinguished by the higher courts at the appeals. Litigating individually is sometimes 
the safest option for the plaintiffs, even though the collective litigation is theoretically 
more efficient and more legitimate from the macro justice perspective. 
Some courts do not favor collective actions and the system that controls the 
judges’ efficiency – created by the National Council of Justice (CNJ) – hinders their prog-
ress, for the complex collective cases are compared to simple and repetitive cases: they 
have the same “value” for the efficiency system. The judges would rather decide a hun-
dred easy cases than adjudicate a single collective action. 
Scholars who recommend the collective procedure as a possible solution in re-
establishing the limits of the Judiciary’s political activity do not know, or prefer to ig-
nore, that this is not a viable option today. Or, at least, is not a safe and trustworthy path, 
since the risks involved are high. If this suggestion were to be taken seriously within the 
current view and application of collective procedure, all possible ways of questioning 
policy by the Judiciary would be blocked. Collective procedure has to be minimally 
46  In 2005, only 28.33% of the funding destined to the National Penitentiary Fund was spent, while only 0.3% 
of the money that should have been invested in the country’s electric energy system was spent. MENDONÇA, 
Eduardo, Da faculdade de gastar ao dever de agir: o esvaziamento contramajoritário de políticas públicas, in: 
SOUZA NETO, Cláudio Pereira de; SARMENTO, Daniel (Orgs.), Direitos Sociais: Fundamentos, Judicialização 
e Direitos Sociais em Espécie, Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2008, p. 232.
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successful in order to be considered an alternative for the people. It cannot be taken as 
a solution as it is today.47 
One can also question the possibility of discussing macro justice issues through 
collective procedure, since it was based on the same procedural rules that discipline 
individual litigation. All collective categories are still bound to the classical individu-
al ones. The system is clearly under development, and not even its basic aspects are 
clearly defined. The definition of a collective right, for example, is not sufficiently clear. 
All the examples of collective rights provided by scholarship are rigorously the same, 
such as the right to a healthy and sustainable environment or the right to free public 
healthcare. The system may have potential to deal with macro justice issues, however it 
is not able to do it just yet. 
 Collective adjudication is, moreover, a breach of the original boundary be-
tween the political and the technical, due to its resemblance to regulation. Even if per-
fected, the system will still give the magistrate a possibility to adjust or create public 
policy. It might be done in a more legitimate way, but it would still be a case of “judici-
alization of politics”. 
6. LAW AND POLITICS: REDEFINING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS?
In the modern state, the authority to resolve disputes and the power to make 
rules are divided into two separate figures; however, it is not easy to detach the judge 
and the legislator. This becomes even more difficult once legal theory, even in civil law 
tradition, recognizes the creative role of the judge. The amount of “creative power” dif-
fers depending on which concept of law is adopted, but today the formalist concep-
tion, affirming that the judge would only apply the law made by the Legislature (never 
creating anything, just following the political decisions which were already made by 
the legislators), is not taken seriously by scholars. Only from this simplistic point of view, 
politics and law, pragmatism and normativism, are completely separated.
There is no evidence that the judges ever performed their tasks in the formal-
ist manner. Certainly their activities were explained and justified in that way, but this 
does not mean the model was an accurate description of reality. In fact, there is only 
evidence that they did not.48 Legal theory may have been formalist in the 1800s, but 
legal practice (the law in action) did not follow the theoretical description, since the 
role of the judge’s perspective on natural law and of the scholarly interpretations of the 
47  In my Ph.D. dissertation, I point out to some possible interpretations of current statutory law that could 
minimize the risks and make collective procedure more effective, not only in adjudication but specially in the 
remedial phase.
48  HESPANHA, António Manuel. “Tomando a história a sério”: os exegetas segundo eles mesmos. In: FONSECA, 
Ricardo Marcelo (Org.). As formas do Direito: ordem, razão e decisão (experiências jurídicas antes e de-
pois da modernidade). Curitiba: Juruá, 2013.
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statutes were very preeminent. Furthermore, the formalist conception of law would ex-
empt the judge from responsibility; after all, he is not responsible for a political decision 
taken by another branch (and he is only applying the law to concrete cases). 
In fact, one can argue that judicialization might not be new at all. Perhaps the 
phenomenon has intensified in the recent decades, but any move towards a triadic 
dispute resolution will judicialize political life. A triadic dispute resolution model is com-
posed by two disputants and a dispute resolver. The triad can be formed consensually 
by the disputants, or it can be compulsory – as happens in the case of jurisdiction.49 
And triadic dispute resolution is certainly no novelty. 
Triad rule-making is legislative by nature, because it constantly adapts the given 
normative structure to the demands of the disputants. At the same time, the legislator 
also performs a dispute resolution function, for the laws prevent conflicts from arising 
and help solve  them once they occur. If the judge is supposed to enforce the lawmak-
er’s binding law, the dispute resolution has to be coercive. In this case, dispute resolu-
tion is also authoritative rulemaking; thus, the legislator shares the rule-making power 
with the judge.50 The first makes generic and prospective rules, while the second makes 
particular and retrospective ones. 
Both will face serious legitimacy issues. The legitimacy of the triadic dispute res-
olution depends on the neutrality of the judge, and this neutrality is hampered by her 
capacity to make rules. The legislator, on the other hand, has to create rules for an entire 
community, which generates its own legitimacy problems.51 These are aggravated by 
the crisis of the representation model in contemporary democracies. 
The phenomenon of judicialization of politics can also be considered, therefore, 
the result of regular use of triadic dispute resolution – not something completely new, 
but the evolution of something that was already there. 
It is doubtful the judge ever had a passive and mechanical role towards the law. 
In fact, “law has been identified to subsumption not only because of the myopia or 
stubbornness of some analysts and Law professionals, but also because subsuming is 
the role of the Judicial Branch in the context of separation of powers in its classical 
view.”52
If the law is a complete and coherent system – as the past formalists would be-
lieve – the judge can simply subsume and apply the given law to any concrete case. As 
49  STONE SWEET, Alec, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, Comparative Political Studies, 
v. 31, p. 147–184, 1999, p. 150.
50  Ibid., p. 161–162.
51  Ibid., p. 162.
52  RODRIGUEZ, Jose R., The Persistence of Formalism: Towards a Situated Critique beyond the Classic Separa-
tion of Powers, The Law and Development Review, v. 3, n. 2, 2010, p. 52.
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mentioned, all political discussions have been finished in parliament and the rules are 
clear and stable. The outcomes are predictable and this favors economic activity.53
This conception has institutional consequences and a complete separation of 
the main functions (not all functions, for there are still checks and balances) on the two 
branches. However, if the standard mode of reproducing the law ceases to be through 
subsumption, the scheme will fail – or should fail, at least. What, after all, should the 
Judiciary do if the application of law is considered a complex activity? If no law is ready 
to be automatically applied, the role of the judge is suddenly creative, but this role is 
also difficult to limit. 
Most critiques of the judicialization of politics focus on condemning the cases 
in which the magistrates have crossed the line and invaded political territory. Scholars 
can say, in those cases, what the Judiciary should not do. However, there is no defini-
tion of what the Judiciary should do, especially in abstract terms. In the Brazilian cases 
involving the right to free public healthcare, should the judges defer to the political 
branches and wait until they decide it is time to provide this or that treatment? Should 
they follow the formalist logic by the book?
The new role of the Judiciary and the Legislative is yet to be defined, but this 
definition is inevitable, for the current concept of separation of powers is incompatible 
with contemporary notions of law. 
One can certainly not ignore the inherent conflict between popular sovereignty 
and the rule of law, especially if you consider the fundamental rights that are protected 
from the parliament’s majority.54 However, one can also consider the Judiciary as an-
other space of political dispute.
If the creation and the application of legal rules are not distinct and opposed 
by nature, it is possible to perceive that there is an ongoing and procedurally estab-
lished conflict (since the interaction between Legislative and Judiciary is defined by 
the checks and balances system) for the creation and application of these rules.55 Their 
sense is not defined by a single branch, and it may even be defined by none of the 
branches. 
The Judiciary is another space of political dispute. The law, perceived by Marxist 
thought as part of an ideology that perpetuates the domination of the working classes, 
has been used by these working classes and has submitted to their interests – at least 
in part.56 The social rights included in the Constitutions (in many cases, fundamental 
53  Ibid., p. 52–55.
54  NEUMANN, Franz, O Império do Direito: teoria política e sistema jurídico na sociedade moderna, São 
Paulo: Quartier Latin, 2013, p. 32.
55  Ibid., p. 19.
56  RODRIGUEZ, José Rodrigo, Franz Neumann: o direito liberal para além de si mesmo, in: MARCOS NOBRE 
(Org.), Curso livre de teoria crítica, Campinas: Papirus, 2008, p. 107.
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rights protected from parliamentary majority) are conquests of these working classes 
by political processes. The “creation” of the law has always been seen as a part of these 
processes, where all society (theoretically), working class or not, can take part and try to 
find a way to defend their interests. 
Once these rules have been created, they need to be applied and effectuated, 
and this is another part of the mentioned political processes. The Judiciary is the arena 
where the non-application or non-enforcement of these rules is to be discussed. After 
all, the political dispute does not end with a piece of legislation, and it may be far from 
ending if this piece is not enforced. 
It seems more important to perfect the judicial process in order to allow the 
political disputes to take place than to insist in an old concept of separation of powers, 
and with it, an inadequate concept of law. Great changes in the way law is perceived, 
applied, created and reproduced have already brought transformations to the three 
branches. There is no crime in that. After all, there is no such thing as the true essence 
of law. 
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